








a Good ‘Bad Bank’? 
The Irish, Spanish 
and German Experience
Stephanie Medina Cas, Irena Peresa
DISCUSSION PAPER 036 | SEPTEMBER 2016
European Economy Discussion Papers are written by the staff of the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with 
them, to inform discussion on economic policy and to stimulate debate. 
 
The views expressed in this document are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent the official views of the European Commission, the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF 
management. 
 

























Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for 
the use which may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors which, 
despite careful preparation and checking, may appear. 
 
 
This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers  
to your questions about the European Union. 
 
Freephone number (*): 
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). 
 
 
More information on the European Union is available on http://europa.eu. 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 
 
 
KC-BD-16-036-EN-N (online)   KC-BD-16-036-EN-C (print) 
ISBN 978-92-79-54444-6 (online)  ISBN 978-92-79-54445-3 (print) 





© European Union, 2016 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
 
What Makes a Good ʽBad Bankʼ? 
The Irish, Spanish and German Experience  
Stephanie Medina Cas, Irena Peresa  
Abstract  
 
This paper examines the experience of three asset management companies (AMCs) or ʽbad banksʼ 
established in the euro area following the 2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, it studies NAMA, 
Sareb and FMS Wertmanagement (FMS). These AMCs were set up to purchase growing non-
performing loans on banks’ balance sheets with the aim of their eventual disposal. The study seeks to 
identify factors that support an AMC’s success. It also analyses the impact of the European regulatory 
framework, including the Eurostat rules, State-aid regulations and bank resolution rules, on the 
AMCs’ design. It also reflects on the way recent changes to EU bank resolution rules now limit the 
involvement of State aid in AMCs. The study finds that the type of assets transferred and the 
macroeconomic environment are crucially important for successful asset disposals. The paper also 
focuses on additional success factors, such as clean asset documentation, a solid valuation process, 
efficient asset servicing, a strong legal framework and skilled staff. Though challenges remain, the 
three AMCs have contributed to banking sector stabilisation as they have been undertaken alongside 
bank restructuring measures. The financial backing of the authorities, decisive in the cases analysed, 
has however come at a fiscal cost. 
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Following the global financial and economic crisis, several euro-area countries set up asset management 
companies (AMCs), also known as ‘bad banks’ (1), to address banks’ growing non-performing loans 
(NPLs) that were undermining financial stability. In 2009, the Irish authorities created the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA). The German ones set up the FMS Wertmanagement (FMS) in 2010. In 
Spain, the Management Company for Assets Arising from the Restructuring of the Banking Sector 
(Sareb) was created in 2012 (2). All three AMCs took on impaired assets that were significant in absolute 
and relative terms to the size of their respective countries’ GDP (Graph 1.1). NAMA and Sareb acquired 
real-estate related assets from several banks, while FMS acquired different categories of assets, from real 
estate to structured products, from one banking group. The three AMCs are today at different stages of 
portfolio disposal. As in many countries public finances deteriorated strongly due to the economic 
downturn and banking sector bail outs, the design of the AMCs was highly influenced by the Eurostat 
fiscal accounting principles. Since the creation of the AMCs provided impaired asset relief by the state to 
the affected banks, their establishment also had to be approved under the European Commission’s 
State-aid rules. These rules were critical for the valuation of the assets transferred to the AMCs and for 
determining the accompanying banking sector reforms. The establishment of new AMCs or similar 
initiatives is a reality, a case in point being the NPL securitisation measure supported by state guarantees 
or Garanzia Cartolarizzazione Sofferenze (GACS), and the Atlante fund in Italy. This warrants a closer 
look at some of the already existing cases for policy purposes. 
This paper seeks to identify key factors that underpin the success of AMCs. It does this by reviewing 
existing studies on the issues affecting the establishment of AMCs. It also provides a full overview of the 
three established AMCs’ institutional framework and operational strategies. The study also analyses the 
importance of the European regulatory framework, including recent updates to the Eurostat rules, 
State-aid guidelines and bank resolution rules, for the AMCs’ structure. It also provides a brief synopsis 
of GACS and the potential role of Atlante, a rescue fund established in April 2016, in helping Italian 
banks (Box 5.1). The paper attempts to assess the effectiveness of the AMCs in terms of achieving their 
objectives related to the disposal of their assets and the broader repair of the banking sector. NAMA has 
been in existence for longer and is the most advanced in terms of portfolio disposals, followed by FMS 
                                                          
(1) The term ‘bad bank’ is somewhat a misnomer because AMCs are by and large not real banks as they do not have a banking 
license and are not subject to the standard banking regulations.  
(2) The three AMCs analysed were chosen because they were amongst those established within the euro area during the recent 
financial crisis. At the same time, they differ sufficiently to usefully illustrate different policy approaches in the set-up of 
AMCs.  
Graph 1.1: Value of initial and current portfolio 
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and then Sareb. The latter has also faced a more difficult market environment of the sale of its assets and 
challenges related to new accounting rules.   
The study finds that the type of assets transferred, along with the general macroeconomic environment, 
usually dictate the pace of disposal. This has been especially important for NAMA which has operated 
amid a strong pick-up in real-estate prices, while Sareb has only recently benefitted from a recovery in the 
real-estate market. FMS faces more challenges disposing of its assets due to their complexity and 
heterogeneity. All three AMCs have solid governance and management frameworks which underpin their 
performance. In terms of policy recommendations, the paper emphasizes the importance of clean asset 
documentation and a solid valuation process, a strong legal framework, efficient asset servicing and 
skilled staff. The financial backing of Irish, German and Spanish authorities has been crucial to these 
AMCsʼ progress, though it has come at a fiscal cost. The new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) now limits the establishment of AMCs with State aid to only when a bank is in resolution and 
with a bail-in of creditors prior to transferring assets to an AMC. This constrains the design of future 
support modalities for banks burdened by large amounts of non-performing assets. In any case, AMCs 
should be created as instruments for bank repair and restructuring only alongside complementary banking 
sector measures. 
This paper has six sections. Section 2 reviews the existing economic literature on the considerations 
surrounding the setup of an AMC. Section 3 provides an overview of the three AMCs analysed and a 
scene setter focusing on the economic and financial context of their establishment. Section 4 reviews the 
EU regulatory framework at the time as well as its subsequent changes. Section 5 evaluates the AMCs’ 
efficiency so far in achieving their objectives and provides a snapshot of the Italian GACS and the Atlante 
fund. Section 5 concludes and draws policy lessons from the AMCsʼ work. The Annex serves as 
background as it gives the following information on the setup of NAMA, Sareb and FMS: their 
objectives, ownership, funding, structure, strategy, asset management specificities, governance and 
transparency aspects, servicing and other operational and legal considerations. It contains details that are 
often crucial for a thorough understanding of the AMC. 




The design of an AMC is conditioned by several factors, such as the amount and type of distressed assets 
as well as the size of the banking system (Aggarval and Aritomo, 2012). Big banking systems with a large 
amount of distressed assets, especially if of the same type, will usually call for publicly-supported and 
centralised entities. The fiscal capacity of the government for additional borrowing and the prospects of 
involving private investors are likewise crucial as they determine the ownership structure of the AMC, 
and so is the political will or lack thereof, to support the state rescue of the banks.  
Objectives 
An AMC is an entity created to purchase, manage and ultimately dispose of distressed, usually non-
performing assets from banks. It aims to spread existing losses over a longer period of time and maximise 
profits from sales. AMCs are typically part of a broader tool-kit of measures aiming at stabilising one or 
more banks, or even the whole financial system, and at restoring credit supply as the basis of an efficient 
allocation of capital in the economy. The goal is to have banks recognise losses from the sale of their 
distressed assets to the AMC often at a price below the book value, have them possibly undergo public or 
private recapitalisation, and re-start lending. The AMCs themselves focus on maximising the recovery 
value of acquired assets by disposing of them as the market normalises. However, combining this primary 
goal with other social initiatives, such as the provision of housing, can lead to conflicting goals for the 
entity (Ingves et al, 2004). 
Rationale 
Separating bad loans from performing assets allows bank managers to focus on standard bank lending 
(Landier and Ueda, 2009). Such carve-out reduces uncertainty for debt and equity investors, leading to 
improved valuation of the banks and lower banks’ funding costs. Moreover, in cases where previous 
lending had been imprudent, the separation of the loan from the original lender can result in a more 
objective assessment of credit quality, and thus better valuation and credit discipline (Aiyar, Bergthaler, 
Garrido et al, 2015). When markets are very illiquid, an AMC can be critical for price discovery, fill the 
pricing gap and aid the development of a functioning market. The exchange of bad assets, usually for 
government bonds or government-guaranteed bonds, provides capital relief to the banks. Finally, the 
removal of toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets can lead to an improvement in bank profitability 
(Woo, 2002).  
Structure  
A decentralised AMC means that the asset management is undertaken by the bank itself and these AMCs 
also tend to be private. Such an entity focuses only on one or more specific banks or specific asset classes, 
in any case on a smaller share of assets in the whole system. A decentralised AMC can take the form of 
an internal workout unit of a bank. Generally speaking, banks should be better placed to resolve NPLs 
than a centralised AMC as they already have the loan files and institutional knowledge of the borrower 
(Klingebiel, 2002). Leaving the distressed assets in the banks may increase incentives for banks to 
maximise the recovery value of bad debt. Byrne (2015) further distinguishes between such ‘in-house’ 
AMCs and ‘single-purpose’ entities set up by a government to deal with the assets from a single bank.  
A centralised AMC involves one workout entity with some degree of public ownership (Klingebiel, 
2002). This centralised, ‘systemic’ approach implies the pooling of a larger share of distressed assets in 
the financial system. Impaired assets are placed in a single entity that can benefit from economies of scale 
in terms of resources and expertise as well as a standardisation of workout practices. This results in an 
ability to attract investors searching for sizeable portfolios and to sell larger quantities of assets. 
Managing specific loans and assets may require different skills than those usually available in a bank 
(Ingves et al., 2004). A more permanent engagement of a larger team of specialists (i.e. for real estate or 




sometimes toxic borrower-lender link, resulting in more leverage over borrowers and in a more efficient 
loan collection (Klingebiel, 2002).  
Ownership  
With regards to ownership, AMCs can be public or private entities, or a mixture of both. When the 
owners are the banks themselves, it raises some issues because ultimately, the risk of losses on the 
impaired assets is still with the banks. The operational division line with the ‘main’ bank can be defined 
in different ways, but the balance sheet remains consolidated. Private AMCs can also benefit from state 
guarantees. This is because when a significant amount of distressed assets has to be transferred over a 
short time period, it can be difficult to find a private investor without government guarantees. In this case, 
the government may be in a better position to (partly) own the AMC itself and benefit from any possible 
future price rise of the AMC’s assets (Ingves et al, 2004). Public AMCs, or partly publicly-owned AMCs, 
are created by and accountable to state authorities and ultimately, the taxpayer. Here, the state bears risks 
as well as potential gains, with repercussions on the sovereign’s fiscal position. Claw-backs can be 
introduced to safeguard public funds in the case of losses (Aiyar et al, 2015). Public entities can benefit 
from special legal prerogatives, but are also more prone to being politicised (Gandrud and Hallenberg, 
2013).  
Selection of assets 
The choice of assets eligible for transfer is very important. The AMC should purchase assets that it can 
manage more effectively than the bank (Woo, 2002). The transfer of whole asset portfolios would stem 
from the need for banks to terminate their non-core activities, so strategic and non-strategic assets need to 
be identified. It is also possible to impose size limits on the assets transferred: it may be more efficient to 
leave smaller loans with the bank. If the affected bank is to remain operational, the asset transfer should 
be a one-off event and not an open-ended process, to prevent moral hazard (Ibid.). Securitisation of assets 
can also be made easier when assets are dealt with in larger quantities and when underlying loan 
portfolios are more diversified. 
Funding 
Funding usually comes in the form of state-guaranteed senior debt, subordinated debt or common equity. 
Risk management and hedging needs derive from the fact that purchased portfolios often come with 
funding mismatches that need to be covered. There is the option of having a banking license as it can 
improve access to capital markets (thus lowering funding costs) and enable direct access to central bank 
funding. On the other hand, it leads to higher capital requirements and enhanced regulatory supervision.  
Asset management and disposal 
The portfolio disposal strategy should reconcile the need for fast disposals with that of obtaining a higher 
return. A slower disposal exposes the AMCs to the risk of further deterioration of asset values, as well as 
higher funding needs for longer. Aggarval and Aritomo (2012) suggest that highly capital intensive assets 
should be fixed (restructured or hedged) and sold as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is better to 
wait with the sale of medium-term performing assets that are not very capital-consuming, illiquid long-
dated assets or assets whose fixing and/or sale costs would be prohibitively high. The release of a large 
volume of assets may lead to a dampening of prices and destabilization of the market. That being said, 
ensuring sufficient market supply and setting price floors can also help normalize market expectations 
(Woo, 2002), which is why these two trends should be carefully balanced. Immediate actions upon the 
establishment of the AMC include data collection and clearing, categorization and prioritization of assets 
and the setting-up of specialized work-out teams. It is important to identify prospective buyers and tailor 
the assets for sale, taking into consideration securitization options if available. A ‘factory’ approach that 




relies mostly on time in order for assets to recover in value. An example of the former would be the 
completion of unfinished buildings whenever it makes sense with respect to the costs, so as to increase 
their market value and facilitate disposal at a profit. 
Governance and transparency 
It is necessary to establish an operational structure that will guarantee independence and efficiency. Due 
to the large amounts of assets it may handle, an AMC should be insulated from political interference 
(Ingves et al., 2004). AMCs often hire new staff in order to signal a break with the past and position 
themselves as standalone units. The AMCs institutional independence should be protected while 
preserving its accountability to the public through regular reports and audits, especially if it has received 
state support. As AMCs often do not hold banking licenses, they are not necessarily under central bank 
supervision, which is why their supervisory framework should be defined. The structure, business model 
and mandate of the entity need to be communicated clearly to all stakeholders.  
Legal aspects 
An effective legal system is one of the prerequisites for a successful operation of AMCs as the distressed 
assets often involve disputed claims. The AMC must assume the role of the former lender, which is 
obtained by ensuring a clean transfer of titles and the removal of legal obstacles, such as any requirement 
of the debtor’s permission that would impede a transfer of assets (Parker, 2011). The legal framework 
should facilitate an orderly debt resolution without impediments for realization of collateral when needed, 
and strike the balance between protecting debtors and lenders alike. The courts should be adequately 
equipped for the handling of such cases without major bottlenecks that could hamper the timeliness or 
quality of the process. According to Klingebiel (2002), a deficient regulatory environment was often the 
reason for the underperformance of AMCs, which is why it is important that relevant foreclosure, 
bankruptcy and seizure of collateral frameworks are established. 
Incentives 
The specific nature of AMCs means that the more successful they are in achieving their mandate, the 
faster they are wound down. Ingves et al (2004) point out the need to develop the right set of incentives 
within their governing bodies and employees, as staff recruitment and retention are problems that often 
arise. Additional challenges pertain to public AMCs whose staff falls under a public salary system which 
is less flexible. In order to correct this, a mix of salary and performance-based bonuses can be 
implemented (Parker, 2011). Staff retention policies are likewise important to ensure the consistency in 
the quality of work of the AMC, so attention should be paid to employee development, compensation 
schemes and career prospects.  
Other operational issues 
Creating a separate AMC can be very costly also because separate organization structures and IT systems 
need to be established (Brenna et al, 2009). Some of the AMCs services may be outsourced to the banks 
themselves or other providers. For instance, the transfer and processing costs for an AMC of working out 
some smaller assets might be larger than having these assets stay with the ‘good bank’ (Klingebiel, 2000). 
High-quality and cost-effective information technology (IT) systems have to be enabled to ensure an 
optimal portfolio management. Furthermore, data cleansing processes are very important for correct asset 
pricing and for the sale process. They can be tedious as they often involve tracking down initial credit 
applications as well as additional actions such as renegotiations. The files inherited from banks, including 
collateral documentation, need to be reviewed and completed in case of missing information. This is not 
an easy task as it involves the engagement of numerous specialized experts (surveyors, civil engineers, 
attorneys, etc.) implying additional time and costs.  
3. SCENE SETTER 
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3.1. MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONTEXT 
Although the establishment of NAMA, Sareb and FMS was a consequence of the 2008 global economic 
and financial crisis, the three AMCs were designed under differing circumstances. Being a small open 
economy with a domestic banking sector that had grown to over 470% of GDP, the initial impact of the 
crisis was the most severe in Ireland. Economic output contracted sharply in 2008/09, most of the 
financial system was significantly affected by a liquidity crunch and the amount of non-performing loans 
soared (Table 3.1). NAMA was established in late 2009 to carve out impaired assets from all but one of 
the domestic banks (3). On the other hand, the Spanish banks weathered the onset of the financial crisis in 
2008 due to high capital buffers and a less severe economic downturn. The Spanish banking crisis was 
different to Ireland’s: though also systemic in nature, about 70% of the financial sector in Spain did not 
need public financial support. However, growth remained sluggish for longer in Spain. This caused the 
amount of impaired assets to rise further on banks’ balance sheets, so by 2012 Sareb was created as an 
asset relief measure for nine state-owned and private banks facing capital shortfalls. In Germany, the 
more diversified banking sector did not undergo such an acute systemic shock as in Ireland and Spain. 
The German FMS was established in 2010 to deal with a single nationalised bank group, the HRE group, 
whose business model was particularly affected by the global liquidity crunch. 
The financial crisis in Ireland was mostly a result of one of the largest real-estate bubbles in advanced 
economies in recent times, fuelled by excessive bank lending to firms and households. The domestic 
banks’ balance sheets expanded due to lending to property developers with large portfolios consisting of 
office buildings, retail and housing estates. Banks funded their lending mostly by borrowings in 
international wholesale money markets, which is why their freeze in 2007/08 lead to liquidity problems. 
As the magnitude of overvaluation of the property market came to light, banks’ solvency also suffered 
greatly. In 2008, the government issued a ‘blanket’ guarantee on the liabilities of the six main domestic 
banks (4), recapitalized Bank of Ireland (BOI), Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), 
and then nationalized Anglo and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) (5). The systemic bank 
distress prompted the government to set up NAMA in December 2009 to carve out the toxic commercial 
property assets from the banks’ balance sheets. The European Commission approved NAMA’s 
establishment under its State-aid rules in February 2010 (6). Due to acute budgetary pressures resulting 
from banking sector support and a loss of investor confidence, in November 2010 Ireland requested a 
three-year EUR 85 billion financial assistance programme from the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Similar to the Irish case, Spanish banks significantly increased their exposure to the housing and 
construction sector in the mid-2000s. The burst of the real-estate bubble in Spain in 2008 led to severe 
bank distress due to the high amount of problematic real estate loans they held. However, not all banks 
were affected in the same way. First, the savings banks (cajas de ahorros) were more exposed to the 
domestic real-estate market, suffered from serious corporate governance deficiencies and had to be 
recapitalised and/or nationalised. Second, there was a group of small and medium-sized highly leveraged 
banks that were mostly exposed to the corporate sector. Third, there were two large banks which managed 
to keep adequate capital levels, mostly due to having a significant part of their operations abroad. Several 
savings banks underwent restructuring and their number was reduced to one fourth. The public funds used 
for this were channelled through the Bank of Spain’s Fondo de Restructuración Ordenada Bancaria 
(FROB - the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector), established in 2009. In June 
                                                          
(3) Permanent TSB did not participate as it was a retail bank with a negligible involvement in commercial real estate, so there were 
no significant assets to be transferred to NAMA. 
(4) The blanket guarantee scheme was introduced in September 2008. In 2009 it was replaced with the reduced-scope Eligible 
Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme that ended in March 2013.  
(5) Anglo and INBS were merged into the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC), which was liquidated in 2013. 
(6) See EC decision State aid N725/2009 – Ireland, Establishment of a National Asset management Agency (NAMA): Asset relief 




2012, the government requested an 18-month financial assistance programme resulting in EUR 100 
billion committed from the EFSF (though only EUR 39 billion was finally disbursed). The financial 
assistance programme included the creation of Sareb in November 2012 so that credit institutions in 
financial difficulties that received public support could offload their real estate assets. 
The sharp downturn in the German economy in 2008/09 was caused by the global economic crisis that 
particularly affected the export-oriented manufacturing sector. Some segments of the German banking 
sector were also exposed to the global financial turmoil, mostly due to the increase in wholesale lending 
to foreign banks by the Landesbanken (state-owned banks) (Detzer and Heine, 2014). Still, the diversified 
structure of the banking sector, with public, cooperative and private banks as well as regionally, 
nationally and internationally focused banks helped prevent a more severe systemic crisis. To safeguard 
the banks, the government established the Special Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin - 
Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung) to provide government guarantees, recapitalize banks and 
purchase distressed assets. In parallel, the Financial Market Stabilisation Agency (FMSA - Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzmarktstabilisierung) was established to manage SoFFin. The private HRE group had its main 
focus on international commercial real-estate finance. By purchasing the Irish DEPFA bank in 2007, it 
entered infrastructure and public sector finance activities. The flaw of HRE’s business model – financing 
long-term investments with short-term interbank funding – was aggravated by the inclusion of DEPFA, 
and made HRE vulnerable to the contraction in money markets in 2007/08. Under the auspices of FMSA 
and SoFFin, FMS Wertmanagement (FMS) was created as an AMC to deal with toxic assets from the 
HRE Group (7). After several capital injections, the HRE group was nationalized in 2009 and in October 
2010 its portfolio was transferred to FMS. 
                                                          





Table 3.1: Macroeconomic indicators in selected countries 
 
(1) Yellow denotes the year NAMA was created in Ireland, pink the year FMS was created in Germany and blue the year 
Sareb was created in Spain. 
(2) According to the Eurostat House Price Index. For 2015, average growth in the period 2015Q1 to 2015Q3. 
Source: AMECO, Data Insight, ECB, Eurostat, IMF 
 
3.2. OVERVIEW OF NAMA, FMS AND SAREB CASES 
In terms of the three AMCs’ structure, assets and funding, there are more similarities between NAMA 
and Sareb than between either of them with FMS. This is in part due to the nature of the crisis that 
affected Ireland and Spain - systemic financial distress with the burst of a real-estate bubble. Moreover, 
both NAMA and Sareb were established as majority privately-owned entities while FMS was designed as 
an entirely public AMC (Table 3.2). See Section 4.1 for more on the fiscal considerations for the 
ownership structure of AMCs. For more details regarding the set up the AMCs, such as asset disposal and 
governance, see Annex 1. 
NPLs (in % of total loans)
Ireland 1.9 9.8 13.0 16.1 25.0 25.7 20.7 14.9
Spain 2.8 4.1 4.7 6.0 7.5 9.4 8.5 6.3
Germany 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.3 n.a.
Real GDP growth (in %)
Ireland -2.2 -5.6 0.4 2.6 0.2 1.4 5.2 7.8
Spain 1.1 -3.6 0.0 -1.0 -2.6 -1.7 1.4 3.2
Germany 1.1 -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.4 0.3 1.6 1.7
Private sector credit growth (in %)
Ireland 14.0 -4.3 -7.9 -10.0 -4.4 -3.8 -7.2 -10.1
Spain 11.3 1.9 -0.4 -0.1 -3.4 -9.3 -7.2 -3.1
Germany 5.2 2.1 -0.5 1.3 1.8 0.4 0.6 1.8
New private sector credit growth (in %)
Ireland -13.5 -14.5 -50.8 -47.0 -26.8 1.1 -0.3 26.1
Spain -11.1 -8.1 -22.1 -23.4 -8.7 -19.2 -6.6 12.0
Germany 21.5 -8.2 -20.9 -0.9 -2.1 -2.6 0.8 9.9
Property price growth (in %) (2)
Ireland -7.0 -18.8 -12.3 -13.9 -11.4 2.0 13.0 12.1
UK -0.9 -7.8 7.2 -1.0 1.6 3.5 10.0 6.6
Spain -1.4 -6.6 -1.8 -7.6 -14.8 -9.1 0.3 3.4





Table 3.2: Ownership and asset overview 
 
Source: FMS, NAMA and Sareb 
 
In terms of operational structure, NAMA and Sareb are centralised, and FMS is a single-purpose entity. 
These AMCs operational models are defined in special legislation. They are established as limited 
liability companies that operate through one or several special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and sometimes, 
they have special status or prerogatives. All three AMCs have no banking license nor need to comply 
with regulatory capital requirements. NAMA operates through multiple SPVs controlled by a Master 
SPV, held by the National Asset Management Agency Investment Limited (NAMAIL, a public-private 
partnership). NAMA holds a 49% stake in the Master SPV as well as a veto over its strategic decisions. 
FMS is defined as a ‘structurally and financially independent public law entity operating under the 
FMSAʼ (Braakmann and Forster, 2011). It is split into two main operative entities: the FMS Service 
Company and DEPFA Bank plc, which is in wind-down. Sareb is 45% state-owned through FROB. 
There are differences among the three AMCs with regards to the size of the asset portfolios purchased 
(Table 3.3). While the amount of assets transferred (EUR 175.6 billion) makes FMS one of the largest 
AMCs established, its value was just below 7% of the German GDP in 2010. In contrast, while the book 
value of the assets transferred to NAMA was less than EUR 75 billion, this represented 44% of Irish GDP 
in 2009. In terms of scope, NAMA took over assets from all but one of the domestic banks, Sareb 
acquired assets from nine small to medium-sized banks and FMS focused on a single banking group, 
taking over most of its assets. The criteria for the assets to be transferred to the AMC in some cases 
included a minimum value. For NAMA, two participating banks (AIB and BOI) had a minimum loan 
threshold of EUR 20 million in order to cap the number of eligible assets. As to Sareb, only real estate 
properties with a value of over EUR 100,000 and financial assets over EUR 250,000 were transferred. 
AMC Type of ownership Equity holders Type of assets transferred
51% three private companies  loans
49% National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA)
properties as securities for land and 
development and associated loans
FMS Wertmanagement 100% public
100% Financial Market Stabilisation Fund  
(SoFFin)
commercial real estate, commercial real 
estate-workout, infrastructure, public sector 
and structured products
14 national banks
2 foreign banks property develoment loans
10 insurance companies property 
45% Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring 
(FROB)
National Asset Management 
Agency Investment Ltd.
51% private, 49% public
55% private, 45% public
Sociedad de Gestión de 







Table 3.3: Selected indicators of the AMCs analysed  
 
 
(1) Assets and nominal GDP as of the year when the AMC was set up. 
(2) Equals percent difference between transfer value and book value. 
(3) As of end-2015. 
Source: CBI, ECB, Eurostat, FMS, NAMA and Sareb 
 
 
Regarding asset type (Figure 3.1), NAMA and Sareb are similar as they purchased real-estate related 
assets. In NAMA’s case, it was property and secured development loans while in Sareb’s, it was loans as 
well as actual properties. FMS, on the other hand, acquired a much more complex portfolio consisting of 
public sector bonds and loans, structured products, commercial real estate and infrastructure loans. In 
terms of geographical composition, while Sareb took over exclusively Spanish assets, NAMA bought a 
mix of assets, located in Ireland but also the UK (about a third). Over half of NAMA’s property portfolio 
was located in London and Dublin, while Sareb’s assets were more dispersed across Spain. FMS’s 
portfolio is very diversified both geographically and currency wise.  
The three AMCs have recruited a lot of specialised skilled staff with private sector experience. NAMA 
and Sareb mostly outsource asset servicing activities, while FMS does its own servicing. NAMA initially 
left servicing with the participating bank. Now, most of its primary servicing (loan administration, 
charging of interest/fees) is outsourced to Capita Asset Services and AIB for a fee. Special servicing (case 
management, interaction with debtors) is mostly done by NAMA directly, while a small part is also done 
by Capita. When Sareb was set up, it used the contributing banks as servicers but in 2015 it moved the 
administration and management of loans to four private companies. Due to the complexity of the 
portfolio, FMS created its own service provider in 2013. The FMS Service Company capitalised on the 
pooling of internal resources and existing expertise as most of its employees are former HRE staff. 
The liabilities of NAMA consisted of EUR 30.2 billion in state-guaranteed senior bonds, EUR 1.6 billion 
in subordinated bonds whose pay-outs are linked to NAMA’s performance (8) and EUR 100 million in 
equity. Sareb was funded originally with EUR 50.8 billion in state-guaranteed senior debt, EUR 3.6 
billion in subordinated debt (15-year callable bonds convertible into equity) and EUR 1.2 billion in equity 
held by 26 banks and insurance companies. FMS has a different funding strategy due to the large 
refinancing needs stemming from the profile of its assets. The original EUR 124 billion of SoFFiN 
                                                          
(8) NAMA decided to pay interest to the holders of its subordinated debt in 2014, 2015 and 2016. While the payment of the coupon 
is discretionary, the interest rate is the 10-year Irish government bond rate on the day of first issue plus a margin of 0.75%. 
NAMA Sareb FMS
Year of creation 2009 2012 2010
Year due to be unwound 2020 2027 no specific date
Assets transferred (1)
Book value (EUR bn) 74.2 107.4 175.6
    in % of GDP 43.8 10.3 6.8
    in % of banking assets 9.3 3.0 2.3
Transfer value (EUR bn) 31.6 50.8 175.6
     implied haircut in % (2) 57.4 52.7 0.0
Percent of assets disposed (3) 75.3 15.4 46.1
Ireland Spain Germany
Size of the domestic banking system (EUR bn) (1) 801 3595 7517




(government) bonds were replaced by FMS’s own funding by 2011. FMS now funds itself through money 
market instruments and capital market issuances (bonds) at favourable rates due to a sovereign guarantee. 
Graph 3.1: Asset composition 
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4.1. THE IMPACT OF EUROSTAT FISCAL DATA RULES 
Eurostat’s rulings strongly influenced the shape of some of the AMCs established in Europe, especially in 
countries where the absorption capacity for additional public debt was limited, such as Ireland (Gandrud 
and Hallerberg, 2014). They had a significant impact on NAMA and Sareb, but not on the German 
AMCs, Erste Abwicklungsanstatlt (EEA) and FMS Wertmanagement.  
In 2009 Eurostat published a decision on the fiscal impact of measures such as bank recapitalizations, 
guarantees, liquidity assistance and AMCs. Debt issued by publicly owned entities would be counted 
towards public debt and not as contingent liabilities. However, Eurostat provided conditions for special 
purpose entities to be classified outside the general government sector even if they benefitted from 
government guarantees. Such entities would need to have the following features: 1) majority privately 
owned, 2) temporary, 3) established with the sole purpose to address the financial crisis, 4) autonomous in 
decision-making and 5) acquiring assets with a substantial haircut on the purchase price. The creation of 
such privately-owned entities funded by the government would still increase sovereigns’ contingent 
liabilities. Eurostat also decided to treat capital injections into banks as deficit increasing capital transfers 
(government expenditure), and not as financial transactions (acquisition of equity) (9).  
In Ireland, NAMA was classified in the general government sector while a 51% privately-owned SPV, 
NAMAIL, was created in 2009 to comply with the rules for classification as a financial corporation (10). 
This NAMA SPV (11) was temporarily established with the sole purpose of purchasing and managing the 
acquired impaired loans from banks. Its private ownership status was brought into question in 2010 and 
2012 when two of its three investors were nationalized, de facto increasing the public ownership stake in 
the SPV. This is why the Irish Life & Permanent’s (ILP) and Allied Irish Banks’ (AIB) stakes (12) were 
promptly sold to foreign investors.  
The likelihood of NAMA making a significant loss for the government was mitigated by three measures: 
the lack of government guarantees on its subordinated debt, a ‘claw-back provision’ in the form of a 
bank-levy on participating banks (13), and most importantly, a purchase price for the impaired assets that 
implied an average haircut of 57%. The authorities projected that it could only make a loss if the market 
value of the assets acquired increased by less than 10% over its envisioned ten-year lifetime. The large 
haircut applied to the asset purchase was a significant hit for the banks’ capital levels. The necessary 
recapitalisation of the banks that followed led to a large increase in general government debt. The Irish 
government’s capital injections into the banks amounted to 25.7% of GDP in the period from 2008-2014 
(14), and contributed to a rise in the budget deficit from 13.8% of GDP in 2009 to 32.3% of GDP in 2010 
(Table 4.1). In addition, NAMA’s government-guaranteed senior debt issued in 2009 to finance the 
purchase of impaired bank assets represented almost 18% of GDP in additional contingent liabilities for 
the government at the time, though it was not counted towards general government debt. 
In Spain, government debt levels were rising fast from 2008, in part due to the recapitalisation of the 
banks. To minimize further direct impact on public debt levels, the creation of Sareb in 2012 was done 
upon extensive consultation with Eurostat in order to ensure the fulfilment of the afore-mentioned criteria. 
A significant haircut (an average 53%) was applied in calculating the transfer price of the assets 
                                                          
(9) See ESA95 manual on government deficit and debt, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5874253/KS-BE-03-003-
EN.PDF/84dc99bc-bae0-43dd-ba16-3b039f35e158. 
(10) The initial private investors in NAMA were Irish Life & Permanent, New Ireland Assurance (Bank of Ireland Group) and a 
group of clients of Allied Irish Banks Investment Managers. They each provided EUR 17 million of the equity. 
(11) For simplicity, in this paper we refer to NAMA when talking about its SPV. 
(12) The AIB stake was held by AIB Investment Managers, which in turn was sold to a third party. In this way the stake was 
transferred as part of a larger sale.  
(13) In the event of NAMA making a loss, a tax surcharge would be imposed on participating institutions. See NAMA Act, Section 
225, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/34/enacted/en/pdf. 




purchased by Sareb. The AMC was also established as 55% privately-owned. The result was that the 
government-guaranteed senior bonds issued to fund Sareb, representing almost 5% of GDP at the time, 
were certified as a contingent liability. 
In contrast to Ireland and Spain, the German government established two entirely publicly-owned AMCs 
(EEA and FMS). The creation of FMS raised general government debt by about 8 percentage points of 
GDP in 2010, but since there was no haircut on the transfer price of the assets, there was no need for 
capital injections into the concerned bank, the HRE group (Braakmann and Forster, 2011). At the time, 
political considerations were also important for saving the failing banks West LB and HRE outweighed 
the negative fiscal impact of public ownership of the two AMCs. HRE was considered a vital bank for the 
Pfandbriefe (15) market. In the case of EEA, due to the fact that the related failing bank, West LB, was 
owned mostly by public savings banks, it was important to several regional economies. At the time of the 
AMCs’ creation, the fact that Germany’s general government deficits were much lower than Ireland’s and 
Spain’s meant that it was able to absorb the one-off increase in public debt. 
 
Table 4.1: Fiscal indicators in selected countries  
 
 
(1) Yellow denotes the year NAMA was created in Ireland, pink the year FMS was created in Germany and blue the year 
Sareb was created in Spain. 
 
Source: AMECO, NAMA, German Ministry of Finance and Sareb 
 
Recent Eurostat changes 
Eurostat’s European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) led to a further tightening of 
the rules for AMCs to be classified outside of the general government sector. A stronger emphasis was 
put on the entity that effectively bears the financial risk (and whether it is ultimately the sovereign), 
regardless of the AMCs’ ownership structure. The new rules imply that if an AMC is mostly privately-
owned, but its funding benefits from a government guarantee, the AMC would be classified within the 
general government. Moreover, the new system excludes the possibility of establishing AMCs with a 
banking license in order to keep them off the public budget (Gandrud and Hallerberg, 2014). 
                                                          
(15) A type of German bond collateralized with long-term assets, usually property mortgages. The Pfandbrief bonds make a 
substantial share of the German bond market.   
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
General government debt (in % of GDP)
Ireland 42.4 61.8 86.8 109.1 120.1 120.0 107.5 93.8
Spain 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.5 85.4 93.7 99.3 99.2
Germany 64.9 72.4 81.0 78.3 79.6 77.2 74.7 71.2
   of which FMS debt 7.4 6.9 5.9 4.7 4.7
Contigent liabilities (senior debt)
   NAMA, EUR billion 30.2 28.7 29.1 25.4 22.7 13.6 8.1
   NAMA, in % of GDP 17.8 17.2 16.7 14.6 12.6 7.2 3.8
   Sareb, EUR billion 50.8 49.0 45.5 45.0
   Sareb, in % of GDP 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.2
General government balance (in % of GDP)
Ireland -7.0 -13.8 -32.3 -12.6 -8.0 -5.7 -3.8 -2.3
Spain -4.4 -11.0 -9.4 -9.6 -10.4 -6.9 -5.9 -5.1




4.2. STATE AID AND BURDEN SHARING CONSIDERATIONS 
AMCs need to abide by EU State-aid regulations when acquiring impaired assets from banks. The 
transfers can either not involve State aid or involve State aid, which - under certain conditions – can be 
declared compatible under Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (16) ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. The Commission’s 
Impaired Asset Communication (IAC, 2009) (17) sets out in detail the State aid compatibility criteria for 
the transfer of impaired assets. It defines impaired asset relief as any action that ‘frees the beneficiary 
bank from the need to register either a loss or a reserve for a possible loss on its impaired assets and/or 
frees regulatory capital for other uses’. The restructuring required under State aid rules for a bank which 
receives State aid, also in the form of impaired asset measures, is defined in the 2009 Restructuring 
Communication (18). 
The IAC defines the following criteria for asset relief measures to comply with State-aid rules: 
 There should be full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments and an upfront viability 
assessment of banks, ‘with appropriate identification of the problems’. 
 There ought to be adequate burden sharing of the costs related to the transfer of assets between the 
government and the banks’ shareholders and creditors. When setting the transfer price, the haircut 
applied has to make banks recognize losses. Ideally, the burden sharing would be ensured ex-ante and 
bank shareholders would be bailed in. If this is not possible (19), banks should be made to contribute at 
a later stage by, for example, introducing claw-back clauses. 
 There should be an alignment of incentives for distressed banks with public policy objectives. The 
timeframe for the bank to participate in asset relief schemes should be limited to six months from the 
launch of the AMC scheme. This is to encourage a rapid resolution and to avoid moral hazard. 
 When determining the eligibility of assets, there should be a balance between restoring financial 
stability and the need to return to normal market functioning in the medium-term. Eligible asset 
classes are defined as those that have caused the financial crisis and have become illiquid, implying a 
broad scope of assets. 
 The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology and be coordinated in advance 
with the Commission, who might also consult experts on the valuation methods. It should be based on 
all information known at the time when the valuation is undertaken. 
 The management of assets should feature a clear functional and organisational separation between the 
beneficiary bank and the assets, to prevent conflicts of interest.  
 A restructuring plan for each beneficiary bank has to be approved by the Commission. The plan 
should focus on restoring the bank to viability, on the burden sharing arrangements and on the 
measures to limit possible distortions to competition. 
                                                          
(16) See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2012.326.01.0001.01.ENG 
(17) See Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (2009/C 
72/01), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:072:0001:0022:EN:PDF. 
(18) See Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in 
the current crisis under the State aid rules, OJ C 195, 19.08.2009., http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:195:0009:0020:EN:PDF. 




According to the IAC, the valuation and transfer price of the impaired assets are critical in determining 
the presence and the amount of State aid. If the transfer price of the assets is equal or lower than the 
market value at the time of the transfer, the creation of the AMC does not imply State aid. If however, the 
transfer price exceeds the market price, the impaired asset measure involves State aid. It can be declared 
compatible if the transfer price of the assets is not higher than the real economic value (or underlying 
long-term economic value) of the assets. The real economic value can be based on the discounted cash 
flow projections of the assets until its maturity (20). The difference between the transfer price and the 
market price of the assets represents State aid (Graph 4.1). In cases where it is very complex to forecast 
developments in prices (due to illiquid markets for instance), uniform haircuts to asset classes can be used 
to approximate the real economic value of assets. In general, the impaired asset measure would be State 
aid compatible if the transfer price would be equal or lower than the real economic value as this ensures 
burden sharing by the banks: since the price is set below the book value (the price of the asset on the 
bank’s balance sheet), banks need to write-off the difference between the book value and the transfer 
price. Setting the transfer price below the real economic value can provide compensation to the 
authorities for risk, in the form of a possible upside asset appreciation. To establish the amount of State 
aid (transfer value minus market value), the asset transfer needs to be preceded by an independent and 
comprehensive assessment of the real economic value and the market price of the distressed assets.  
In certain exceptional cases, the IAC (21) provides that an impaired asset measure could be declared 
compatible even if the transfer price is above the real economic value. This would be allowed if the bank 
can contribute at a later stage to the losses for instance via recovery or claw back clauses, or if it offers 
more extensive restructuring measures, or presents an orderly winding-up plan. Moreover, in order for aid 
included in an impaired asset measure to be compatible, the requirements stemming from the 2009 
Restructuring Communication need to be fulfilled too. In particular, this includes the return of the good 
bank to long-term viability, or – if this is not possible – its orderly winding down. 
                                                          
(20) The real economic value corresponds to the net present value of the sum of expected cash flows (interest payments and 
principal payments plus corresponding losses) and the appropriate discount rate, which is based on the risk-free rate plus a risk 
premium. For more discussion on the real economic value see Boudghene and Maes, 2012. 




The three AMC cases 
Graph 4.1: Portfolio of impaired assets, valuation and State aid 
 
(1) These conditions include claw back clauses, in-depth restructuring and/or liquidation. 
Source: Commission services 
In the Irish case, the State aid criteria were respected. The Commission agreed with the authorities on a 
methodology to determine the transfer pricing of the distressed assets for NAMA. The decision on the 
establishment of NAMA was authorised by the Commission in early 2010 (22). Subsequently, the 
Commission also approved the actual transfer price for the nine tranches of assets transferred to NAMA 
between 2010 and 2012. Loans were transferred to NAMA at a price equal to their real economic value 
upon a valuation based on information available in November 2009. Thus, this was ‘compatible’ State aid 
as the transfer prices were higher than the prevailing market values but not higher than the real economic 
value. To limit the State aid, burden sharing with junior (subordinated) bondholders in the participating 
banks was introduced, the surviving banks had to present and implement restructuring plans approved by 
the Commission, and two of the participating banks were wound down (23). 
In Spain, the State-aid criteria were also respected. More specifically, State aid rules were implemented as 
the Commission closely monitored the methodology for measuring the value of the impaired assets 
transferred to Sareb at end-2012 and 2013 under the EU financial assistance programme. The 
Commission, assisted by external experts, found the asset transfer in line with State aid rules. The transfer 
value was based on the estimated long-term real economic value of the assets and then a discount was 
applied, also to account for aspects such as expenses to be assumed by the AMC and the negative short-
term outlook for divestment of the assets. The transfer price was about 5-10% below the projected real 
economic value of the assets, hence State aid was ‘compatible’. A conservative transfer price ensured 
remuneration to the government in the form of potential upside in asset value (24). Moreover, in its State 
aid decision on the Spanish banks (25), the Commission took positive note of the burden sharing of equity 
and subordinated debt holders of the banks, acknowledging that the capital need was further reduced 
through bank divestments. Participating banks also had to present restructuring plans to the Commission.  
                                                          
(22) See Establishment of a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA): Asset relief scheme for banks in Ireland, State aid 
N725/2009 – Ireland, OJ C 094, 14.04.2010. 
(23) The Commission also agreed there was adequate burden sharing and remuneration to the government as the purchase price was 
based on a discount rate equal to the Irish government bond yield (risk-free rate) plus a 170 basis points margin to cover for the 
risk of additional losses. 
(24) The banks received low-yielding bonds in exchange for their assets. The Commission considered that this also helped address 
the burden sharing criteria for State aid. 





Unlike in the previous two cases, the Commission found that the asset transfer from HRE to FMS in 2010 
that the transfer price exceeded the real economic value by EUR 16.2 billion as the transfer price was 
equal to the book value. However, the Commission could declare the aid compatible given the partial 
claw back and the in-depth restructuring (including significant downsizing of HRE). It was certain that 
PBB (the core bank left from HRE’s restructuring) was unable to claw back the full difference between 
the transfer price and the real economic value, but as it had been nationalised, proceeds from its 
privatisation would also accrue to the government. The Commission found these additional conditions 
were sufficient for concluding that the aid was compatible. In 2014, DEPFA bank also transferred its 
assets to FMS but this was not deemed State aid since the transfer was done at market prices. 
Recent changes to burden sharing requirements 
Over the last few years, a new legal framework was introduced aiming to deal with distressed banks while 
avoiding the large scale use of public funds that was witnessed during the last crisis. Apart from broadly 
safeguarding the use of taxpayers' money, it was put in place to prevent a negative sovereign-banking 
loop that was among the main roots of the crisis. In providing a standardised framework and set of tools 
enabling bank recovery and resolution and further defining the modalities of State aid, the new legislation 
aims to ensure market discipline by endorsing a more coherent approach to long-term systemic risks.  
In August 2013, important changes to the State aid framework were introduced with the Commission’s 
2013 Banking Communication on State aid rules in order to reduce moral hazard (2013 Banking 
Communication) (26). This followed the trend to include more burden sharing (from subordinated 
debtholders) in bank restructurings: compare for example, the Spanish bank restructuring at end-2012 
with SNS REAAL in the Netherlands in the spring of 2013 (27). In particular, adequate burden sharing is 
required from the shareholders, hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders before any State aid 
can be granted. They must contribute to the maximum extent to reduce the bank’s capital shortfall. The 
2013 Banking Communication also states that an impaired asset measure can only be authorised after the 
bank’s restructuring is approved by the Commission. It is important to note that all three AMCs reviewed 
in this paper were created before the 2013 Banking Communication and before the strengthened burden 
sharing requirements it introduced entered into force. Nonetheless in the autumn of 2013 – after the 2013 
Banking Communication – the Slovenian authorities developed a sector-wide AMC which was fully 
compliant with the new burden sharing rules of the 2013 Banking Communication. 
The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) aims at minimising public sector participation 
and thus toughened the burden sharing requirements for creating an AMC (28). As per the BRRD, a new 
impaired asset measure involving State aid would likely trigger resolution of the beneficiary banks, and 
this primarily means a bail-in of shareholders and creditors equal to at least 8% of total liabilities 
including own funds (29). The BRRD, fully implemented only since 2016, recognises the creation of an 
AMC as a type of bank resolution tool, in that it separates clean and toxic assets between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ banks through a transfer of assets. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) implements the BRRD 
in the euro area. Under the SRM, the set-up of a public or partially public AMC has to be controlled by 
the resolution authorities that can also participate in the ownership structure. The Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) carries out the bank resolution as it decides whether and when to put a bank into resolution, defines 
the resolution scheme and the use of resolution tools. The BRRD limits the use of AMCs only in 
                                                          
(26) See Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the 
context of the financial crisis, OJ C 216, 30.06.2013.  
       http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730(01)&from=EN.  
(27) In the Spanish case, subordinated bond holders were partially bailed in. In SNS REAAL, junior bondholders were fully bailed 
in and lost all their investment, though senior bondholders did not have any losses. 
(28) See Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN. The BRRD sets out the rules for the resolution of credit 
institutions and large investment firms in all EU Member States. 
(29) Bail-in will not apply to deposits backed by a deposit guarantee scheme, short-term interbank lending or claims of clearing 




conjunction with other resolution tools, to prevent a competitive advantage for the failing institution (30). 
It can only be set up if 1) financial markets would be adversely impacted by the orderly liquidation (under 
normal insolvency proceedings) of the assets to be transferred, 2) where the transfer is necessary to ensure 
the proper functioning of the institution under resolution (or bridge institution), or 3) to maximise 
liquidation proceeds. NAMA, Sareb and FMS became operational before the full BRRD implementation 
and were thus unaffected by the revised bail-in requirements. 
Under the BRRD, the conditions defined in the IAC and Banking Communication on burden sharing still 
apply to all State aid for banks. Although the BRRD aims to reduce the use of public funds during a 
banking crisis, it does not forbid the use of public money for bank resolution, especially during a systemic 
crisis. In principle, the use of public funds automatically puts an institution into resolution and the full 
bail-in rules apply. However, there are exceptions when a bank requiring extraordinary public financial 
support shall not be considered as failing or likely to fail with certain types of State aid (31), though asset 
relief through an AMC is not included. The Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will also provide funding 
support for a bank in resolution but it can only do so if at least 8% of the bank’s liabilities have been 
bailed in. These cases will still be subject to State aid rules, including the conversion or write down of 
subordinated debt. However, if an AMC operates with no State aid, then neither bail-in nor bank 
resolution are required. This is the case of the Hungarian AMC MARK that will buy NPLs from solvent 
financial institutions: in February 2016 the Commission assessed, from a strictly State aid perspective, the 
MARK case and found that MARK’s methodology to determine the transfer price of the assets was 
consistent with market values (32).  
                                                          
(30) The transfer of toxic assets from a specific bank should not distort the banking market through helping just one bank when a 
whole asset class, held by multiple banks, is toxic. 
(31) This includes whenever the State aid takes any of the following forms: a state guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by 
central banks according to the central banks’ conditions, a state guarantee of newly issued liabilities, or an injection of own 
funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution. 
(32) See State aid: Commission approves impaired asset management measures for banks in Hungary and Italy, European 
Commission - Press release, Brussels, 10 February 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-279_en.htm. 
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Similar to Klingebiel’s (2002) approach, the effectiveness of the three AMCs is measured based on 
progress towards meeting their narrow as well as their broad objectives. The individually defined aims for 
NAMA, Sareb and FMS, set in national legislation and/or public strategies, have similarities, but also 
some differences (Annex 1). All three AMCs’ narrow objectives refer to management and disposal of the 
assets purchased, while enhancing their value. NAMA and Sareb in addition put a strong emphasis on 
boosting returns to the state or minimising public financial support. They also have a set timeframe for 
asset disposal, and aim at the redemption or servicing of the senior bonds. FMS on the other hand 
emphasises its cost-effective funding. In terms of broader objectives, both Sareb and FMS commit to 
contribute to the financial sector repair. NAMA arguably has the broadest mandate set by a decision of its 
board: to support property market activity and contribute to the socio-economic development in Ireland. 
Narrow objectives 
NAMA has been very effective with the sale of assets - the most advanced of the three AMCs, though it 
has been in existence for the longest time. By end-2015, it had sold 75.3% of its assets in the six years 
since it was established (Figure 5.1). This success is underpinned by the fact that its assets are 
homogeneous, mostly large land and development real-estate loans. Such assets are relatively easier to 
sell than for example, corporate loans, that often involve complex business restructurings. NAMA has 
also benefitted from having part of its asset portfolio located in the UK and especially London, as this 
allowed for significant sales before 2013 as property prices in the UK market started recovering earlier 
(around 2010). The recovery in property prices in Ireland from 2013 onwards has enabled NAMA to also 
advance with the sales of its Irish portfolio. NAMA tends to sell its loans in large packages to institutional 
investors. The ‘factory’ approach (Section 2) to its management of assets has helped enhance their value. 
Moreover, the NAMA Act gave NAMA legal powers that enabled it to collect payments due on loans 
more effectively as it helped speed up asset disposals and ensure income generation from rentals (33). This 
also helped break the past speculative close link between developers and lenders. NAMA’s ability to 
promptly access commercial real estate collateral from insolvent debtors would have been hampered had 
the operating legal framework been similar to the one applying to residential real estate in Ireland, 
characterised by difficulties in collateral realisation and numerous court adjournments. By June 2016, 
NAMA had repaid 85% of its senior bonds and intends to repay them all by end-2018 – about two years 
ahead of the original plan. In terms of accounting framework, NAMA opted to apply the general 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (34) and has taken significant additional provisions on 
its asset portfolio after acquisition. Nonetheless, NAMA has also been profitable since 2011 which makes 
its funding position comfortable. It is expected to make a profit of around EUR 2 billion or 1% of GDP 
for the government by the time it winds down. 
It is still early to judge how successful Sareb will be. As of end-2015, Sareb had sold about 15.4% of its 
portfolio and repaid 14.4% of its senior debt. Sareb’s disposal pace has been lagging those of NAMA and 
FMS in its first three years. This is in part due to the fact that its assets are all located in Spain where the 
property market recovery has been slower and more recent than in Ireland. Most of the real-estate sold is 
in Madrid and Barcelona, where the market has improved most. Sareb also holds a much greater number 
of individual assets, as it received many small value property loans and collateral. Moreover, most of 
those are residential, unlike NAMA’s large commercial real-estate assets. In Spain, access to collateral 
and foreclosure procedures have not been an impediment to Sareb’s performance, if anything they are 
generally judged to be favouring the lenders. Most of Sareb’s sales income comes from the retail channel, 
as opposed to the institutional-investor channel used by NAMA and FMS. In 2014, Sareb stated it would 
revise its disposal strategy from a ‘warehouse’ model towards a ‘factory’ model, more similar to NAMA, 
                                                          
(33) The powers granted include vesting orders and compulsory purchase orders, the right to unilaterally change the language of 
loan contracts, disposal of assets at its discretion, entitlement to obtain tax information on its debtors and the preference/priority 
over payments made by insolvent borrowers. 
(34) NAMA adopted the amortised cost method, used by many banks, under which expected cash flows (and not contractual cash 
flows) are considered to value loans. The assets are priced by taking the ‘actual’ initial value of the asset and future expected 




to increase the value of its assets. Even though the real-estate market started recovering, in 2015 the pace 
of Sareb’s asset disposals slowed down due to its transition to new servicers, a process which was 
completed in April 2016 (35). The new servicers are expected to improve the asset management and 
intensify commercial activity.  
Sareb has been loss-making in 2013 and 2014 but it made an after-tax profit of EUR 0.3 million in 2015 
(in part due to tax credits). Low profitability weighs on its effectiveness as ultimately the possible 
additional cost for its private and public owners remains unclear. It has undergone repeated asset write-
downs due to portfolio revisions, since the assets were transferred rather quickly and most of the assets’ 
due diligence and revaluation was done afterwards. Moreover, only in October 2015 did the Bank of 
Spain release the updated rules for Sareb’s valuation of assets (36). The new rules require the assessment 
of all its assets individually to reflect changes in market prices by end-2016. This resulted in additional 
impairment provisions of EUR 2.04 billion, of which 90% was applied retroactively to the 2014 and 2015 
accounts. For this purpose, Sareb exhausted the buffer provided by its original shareholder equity and in 
addition had to convert EUR 2.17 billion of its subordinated debt into equity. Following the conversion, it 
had EUR 0.95 billion in equity and EUR 1.43 billion in subordinated debt. The new valuation standards 
have implications on its disposal business too, as they require Sareb to focus on operations where the sale 
price of the asset is above the valuation price to generate profits, causing a temporary slowdown in the 
disposal of its assets. 
Graph 5.1: Portfolio disposal pace 
 
Source: FMS, NAMA and Sareb 
FMS has made good progress with the sales of its assets, though the coming years will likely be more 
challenging. At end-2015, it had sold about 46.1% of its original portfolio. Asset disposals in the future 
could become more difficult given the long maturity and complexity of its securities (37). Furthermore, 
according to Moody’s, the majority of FMS’ portfolio reduction has been due to redemptions, not active 
sales (38). FMS has been profitable under the German GAAP accounting framework, largely due to 
                                                          
(35) See Post-programme surveillance report on Spain, autumn 2015 by the European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/ip013_en.htm. 
(36) See The Banco de España approves the accounting Circular for Sareb, Banco de España, Press Release, Madrid, 2 October 
2015, http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/15/Arc/Fic/presbe2015_41en.pdf. 
(37) Its assets preparation for sale is a process that involves, for instance, judicial disputes with Italian municipalities. 
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Though NAMA is most advanced in its asset 
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ordinary activities, since 2012. However, this accounting framework does not require market valuations 
for its assets, implying hidden losses (39). Last available data shows that although FMS’s debt had 
declined by 30% between 2010 and 2014, it still remains substantial at EUR 135 billion (4.7% of GDP), 
mostly as a reflection of its elevated funding needs stemming from the heterogeneous portfolio structure. 
Although the initial strategy was to sell all assets in ten years, FMS subsequently revised it to reflect the 
assets’ long-term average maturity, so it no longer contains a fixed date for the wind down of its 
activities. The business plan is now made every year with a ten year outlook to achieve the best return.  
Broad objectives 
Sareb and NAMA have played important roles in the recovery of the banking sectors in Spain and 
Ireland. NAMA has had a more substantial impact as it removed a higher share of total impaired assets 
from the banking sector (Table 3.3). Schoenmaker (2015) estimates that NAMA took about one third of 
all property loans off the surviving banks’ balance sheets. In Spain, Sareb took over about 10% of credit 
institutions’ total real-estate related assets. The transfer of assets to both AMCs at a steep discount made 
banks recognise upfront the losses on their balance sheets. The implementation of the restructuring plans 
for state-aided banks which benefitted from Sareb and NAMA has advanced well in general and they 
have downsized (40). In Spain, four of these banks have been absorbed by other banks, one was liquidated 
and two remain partly state-owned, Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN) and Bankia. In Ireland, two of the three 
main domestic banks, AIB and PTSB, remain majority state-owned, while the third, BOI, remains 
minority state-owned. The transfer of the impaired assets at a point-in-time value also helped insulate the 
Irish and Spanish banks from the effects of further property price declines. The participating Spanish 
banks became profitable in 2013 and the Irish ones in 2015. For all banks concerned, capital ratios are 
well above regulatory requirements. The ratio of NPLs in Spain and Ireland is declining though for 
Ireland, it remains one of the highest in the euro area (Table 3.1). At end-2015, the NPL ratio for residual 
commercial real estate loans held by the domestic Irish banks was 37%, indicating the difficulties that 
they still face in resolving these loans despite the large amount of assets transferred to NAMA. Likewise, 
though declining, the NPL ratio for real-estate loans in Spain was still elevated at almost 28% at end-
2015. The renewal of Irish and Spanish banks’ lending activities is slow due to the ongoing private sector 
deleveraging, as private debt levels remain high, though new credit flows are rising in both countries. 
In conjunction with SoFFin, FMS has helped stabilise the German financial sector during the crisis (41). 
Its creation signalled the readiness of the German government to support its banks. Although FMS 
received assets from only one bank, the HRE group, the strategic importance of one of its subsidiaries, 
PBB, as one of the main issuers on the Pfandbriefe bond market, made its rescue imperative. The bank 
was sold in 2015 and continues with its restructuring plan, generating new business, while the rest of the 
HRE group is in wind down. The German banking sector is also still dealing with issues stemming from 
the financial crisis, such as the slow reform of the Landesbanken and is facing subdued private sector 
credit growth (42). 
 
                                                          
(39) In 2015, FMS generated pre-tax profits of EUR 413 million from ordinary activities. This was driven by a net interest income of 
EUR 540 million and a reversal of risk provisions of EUR 35 million. According to the GAAP accounting framework, changes 
in market valuation of assets, negative (hidden losses) or positive (hidden reserves), are not incorporated in FMS’s annual profit 
and loss report. For instance, the balance of the market values of all derivative positions was negative EUR 34.7 billion at end-
2015, compared to the initial value at end-2010 of negative EUR 14.6 billion, revealing a hidden loss of over EUR 20 billion. 
(40) For more details, see Post-programme surveillance reports on Spain and Ireland by the European Commission. 
(41) See, for example, Detzer and Heine (2014) or the IMF’s 2010 Article IV staff report on Germany. 










Box 5.1: Recent Italian initiatives for asset quality issues: GACS and the Atlante fund 
In February 2016, the Italian authorities reached an agreement with the Commission on the setup 
of a state-aid-free securitisation framework with state guarantees, the so-called Garanzia 
Cartolarizzazione Sofferenze (GACS). This scheme has been designed in a way which does not 
contain State aid, and therefore it does not fall under the scope of the BRRD or the 2013 Banking 
Communication. It allows the set-up of special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) to facilitate the transfer of 
bad loans out of bank’s books, including by a state guarantee on the SPVs investment-grade rated 
senior notes. The SPVs’ bad loan purchases are to be funded by the issuance of senior- and junior-
ranked notes. A bank setting up such an SPV is required to initially hold and eventually sell a 
minimum of 50% plus one share of the junior tranche to private investors at market prices. This 
requirement is both a condition for the bank in question to have the bad loans derecognized from 
its balance sheet, as well as for the Italian state to issue a guarantee on the SPV’s senior tranches. 
In exchange for providing the guarantee, the state would receive a market-priced fee that increases 
over time to encourage a speedy work-out. The GACS entails a trade-off between the need to 
ensure sufficient attractiveness for junior investors (i.e. resulting in lower prices and increased 
attractiveness for bad loan portfolios, including prospects for upside return) and the potential 
eroding impact of such lower transfer prices (i.e. below the loans’ net book value on banks’ 
balance sheets) on banks’ profitability and capital positions.  
Against this background, Italy’s new private bank stabilisation fund, Atlante, was established in 
April 2016. It may invest part of its financial capacity in SPVs’ junior tranches and as such 
stimulate the creation of a market for these assets. The fund pools EUR 4.25 billion in equity 
contributions from 67 key Italian investors comprising larger banks (including Unicredit and 
Intesa Sanpaolo with EUR 1 billion stakes each), insurers and pension funds. Its primary goal is to 
support recapitalisation operations of weaker Italian banks  by buying unsold shares from public 
offerings (
1
). The EUR 1.5 billion cash call by Banca Popolare di Vicenza at the end of April 2016 
was fully subscribed by Atlante after private investors showed insufficient interest. Atlante’s 
remaining capacity would be available for investment in junior tranches issued by SPVs under 
GACS. Atlante could also purchase junior tranches of securitised NPL structures, trying to spur 
interest for mezzanine and senior tranches by institutional investors (
2
).  
Atlante has limited funds and the largest share may end up being used to support bank 
recapitalisations. Thus it is unlikely to contribute to a substantial reduction of the bad loans stock 
in the Italian banking system, though it also aims to help develop the secondary market for NPLs. 
Moreover Moody’s, while noting the benefits of Atlante for the smaller banks, also warns of it 
potentially exposing the contributing investors to weaker capital positions as the ‘smaller banks to 
be rescued are at risk of resolution’ (
3
). 
The Italian government has complemented the steps above by reforms to shorten lengthy 
bankruptcy and foreclosure processes to raise the market value of bad loans as a further support to 
the development of a private secondary distressed debt market. In addition, the Bank of Italy has 
launched a bank survey on bad loans, collateral and recovery procedures to boost the disclosure of 
information to foster the development of the NPL market. 
                                                          
(1) These banks must undertake a capital increase at the request of the supervisory authorities. 
(2) Atlante’s funds would be used to create an SPV with the capacity to buy EUR 50 billion or more of junior tranches of 
securitised NPLs, depending on the amount of funds available after the purchase of bank shares. 
(3) See Moody’s Sector Comments: ‘Italian Bank Rescue Fund Is Credit Positive for Weaker Banks, but Not a Systemic 




Widening of AMC mandates  
NAMA and to a lesser extent Sareb have embraced social roles which seem to go beyond their primary 
mandates. NAMA became more active in the residential property market, where a supply shortage has 
arisen. While emphasizing the enhancement of the value of its assets, as of May 2016 NAMA had funded 
the delivery of 2,042 social housing units and funded the completion of 2,768 new houses and apartments 
throughout the country. It aims to fund the delivery of 20,000 residential units by 2020. It has done this 
either by funding its debtors or receivers, or through commercial joint funding arrangements with 
developers, where it holds minority stakes. These actions are also linked to the broad objective of socio-
economic development of the NAMA Act. In 2015, a number of Irish developers filed a complaint with 
the Commission regarding the involvement of NAMA in property development, allegedly for breaching 
State-aid rules. Although this is not listed as one of its official objectives, in response to social pressure, 
Sareb also aims to provide up to 4,000 social housing units for rent under a social responsibility mandate. 
As of January 2016, it had transferred almost 1,800 units. It also has plans to provide affordable units for 
entrepreneurs. 
6. LESSONS AND CONCLUSION 
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The examples of NAMA, Sareb and FMS clearly show that the type of assets transferred is one of the key 
determinants that can make an AMC effective. If the assets are rather homogenous and more easily 
realisable, their management will be easier as their administrative and legal considerations will be more 
aligned, allowing for economies of scale on the staffing and technical level. This is clearly the case of 
NAMA whose portfolio consists of almost exclusively commercial real estate. Although Sareb only holds 
real-estate related assets, it has proved more cumbersome to offload them in part due to the portfolio mix 
of smaller residential assets and larger commercial assets. The case of FMS further confirms that a highly 
heterogeneous and complex portfolio poses more challenges for asset sale. 
The macro-economic environment is very important for enabling the sale of assets. This is particularly the 
case for real-estate assets, as NAMA’s and Sareb’s experience reveals. If assets are located in areas where 
there is an economic recovery, this often drives an increase in market demand for that asset, making the 
disposals much easier. Part of NAMA’s portfolio was located in the UK where initially demand was not 
an issue, so there was no immediate pressure to dispose of Irish assets. Eventually, the Irish market also 
recovered, enabling NAMA to shift its resources to domestic sales. On the other hand, Sareb’s portfolio is 
all in the Spanish market, whose recovery, apart from being more recent, has been more modest than the 
Irish. The fact that macroeconomic developments and the type of assets transferred are exogenous factors, 
to some extent beyond the control of policy makers, highlights the need to be conservative with macro-
economic assumptions when setting the AMC’s business plan and during asset valuation. 
The key operational factors supporting a good ‘bad bank’, arising from the experience of the three AMCs 
analysed, are as follows:  
 The importance of clean asset data. The lack of and inadequacy of data has proved problematic in 
countries such as Ireland, where a substantial amount of important documentation was missing or 
flawed, or Spain where Sareb has had issues with insufficient documentation for some assets. Only 
accurate and complete data can be the basis of an objective valuation. In addition, they facilitate the 
creation of optimal portfolios for sale.  
 An adequate legal framework, including sufficient legal powers to restructure or enforce on their 
assets is paramount for AMCs’ effectiveness. In NAMA’s case, it signalled a clear break of the toxic 
lender-debtor relationship. A special legal status also supports a speedier preparation of the assets for 
sale. Insolvency, bankruptcy and foreclosure laws need to be robust in order to ensure that the AMC 
as well as prospective asset buyers can access insolvent debtors’ collateral under fair terms and a 
reasonable timeframe. Had NAMA acquired Irish residential mortgage loans, where access to 
collateral remains problematic, it may have been less successful in their disposal. Moreover, as can be 
seen on the recent Italian case (Box 5.1), when national legislation is deemed weak, it reflects 
negatively on the pricing of the loan portfolios.  
 Skilled management is essential, be it for valuation, development of a successful asset disposal 
strategy, collections or sale decisions. This necessitates a comprehensive yet expedient recruiting of 
specialized staff, often on competing terms with the private sector. Recruiting efforts need to be 
matched with retention policies and an incentivising compensation system given the AMC’s 
temporary nature. 
 An appropriate servicing of assets always supports an effective AMC. In the Spanish case, changes 
and delays in this area have negatively impacted the pace of asset disposal. NAMA and Sareb 
outsource these activities, in part because it is more cost-effective. FMS, on the other hand, opted for 
creating its own servicing entity in order to be more cost-effective by avoiding numerous contracts 




 The experience of Sareb demonstrates that after the initial pricing of the impaired assets, it is desirable 
for the AMC to operate under a stable valuation framework. The release of the Bank of Spain’s asset 
valuation framework for Sareb was delayed and issued in October 2015. The revaluation of the 
portfolio caused higher impairments and a write down of assets which contributed to Sareb’s losses in 
2013-14. The new accounting valuation framework may result in additional provisioning needs. 
Having it in place from the start would have introduced more certainty on Sareb’s financial 
performance. The different accounting frameworks of the three AMCs make the comparison of their 
financial performance less straightforward than if they had the same ones.  
In the European context, much can be learned from the experience of the three AMCs analysed. Given the 
systemic nature of the banking crises and the large value of impaired assets, the choice of a centralised 
structure was appropriate for NAMA and Sareb. Its benefits include a consolidation of scarce work-out 
skills and resources in one entity as well as a centralised control over collateral which provides more 
leverage over debtors, ensures better management and facilitates public oversight. As it took over assets 
from only one bank, FMS was set up as a single-purpose entity, though it still enjoys many of the benefits 
of a centralised structure such as the pooling of staff. The governance structures of all three AMCs are 
solid, while their transparency is high with the publication of regular reports, audits and news releases. 
Mixed private-public ownership has brought benefits to Sareb and NAMA. Attracting private capital was 
important for the AMCs. Sareb drew 26 private financial entities to invest in its equity structure that 
reflected, to some extent, confidence in the AMC. Moreover, a majority privately-owned structure has 
allowed keeping the NAMA and Sareb senior bonds as contingent liabilities, and thus off the general 
government balance sheets. This has helped overcome fiscal limitations at a time when Ireland and Spain 
were under fiscal pressure due to the bank bailouts. In order to be considered majority privately-owned, 
the then applicable Eurostat 2009 rules required a large discount on the transfer value of the assets, which 
led to a crystallisation of losses for the participating banks. On the other hand, significant public sector 
involvement in Sareb and NAMA has shown that the governments were politically committed to 
resolving the problem of a large quantity of impaired assets in their banking system and more broadly to 
achieving financial sector stability.  
The FMS case indicates that the strong fiscal position of a country can have a strong influence on the type 
of ownership of the AMC, in this case full public ownership. Though FMS also aims to maximise the 
value of its assets, this is harder as the transfer price was set at book value, limiting any upside and 
making it more difficult to attract investors. The rather illiquid and complex nature of FMS’s remaining 
assets, as well as their very long maturities, led to the removal of a fixed time frame for asset disposal and 
increased the risk of FMS becoming a public repository of bad assets taken from the HRE group. How 
long it will remain profitable under current terms is unclear. FMS’s debt is already on the German 
government’s balance sheet, though its potential hidden losses may also end up burdening the 
government. Similarly, Sareb’s ongoing losses are also of concern as part of its senior debt (totalling 
about 4% of GDP) may end up being absorbed by the Spanish government, if Sareb cannot repay it. 
NAMA in particular illustrates that the active or ‘factory’ model to asset disposal can contribute towards 
maximising the assets’ recovery value over a fixed time span, and generating fiscal returns to the 
government in order to (partly) compensate for the public financial support received. In Ireland, a single 
AMC purchased a large share of total commercial real-estate assets. ‘Adding value’ to the assets has been 
extended in some cases to the inclusion of new development projects, beyond the mere completion of 
already existing projects. This could potentially distort the ordinary functioning of the commercial 
property market. Combining original goals with additional socio-economic activities like providing social 
housing or new development projects can risk leading to conflicting objectives and can deter from the 
primary mandate. As Sareb also undertakes activities to deliver affordable housing for rent, it should be 
cautious not to distort the market or interfere with its ability to dispose of real-estate assets and its 
financial performance. Overall, when these AMCs were created, limited thought was given to the urban 




intervention and can politicise the tension between the usage of real estate and its financial value (Byrne 
2015). 
The three case studies show that an AMC can be effective in helping stabilise the financial sector, 
however it remains only one tool among many. In the case of NAMA and Sareb, the transfer of assets at 
discounted values to the book price made banks recognise losses upfront so that their remaining core 
business could focus on consolidation and the resumption of lending. In addition, the creation of NAMA 
and Sareb helped improve the banks’ liquidity as it replaced their distressed loans (with little collateral 
value) with the AMC’s senior bonds eligible as collateral for Eurosystem funding. FMS helped stabilise 
the German banking system by ensuring the continuity of the Pfandbriefe market. NAMA and Sareb have 
also helped develop a functioning secondary market for distressed assets by sending a price signal 
through the sale of impaired assets (43). The creation of NAMA, Sareb and FMS alongside public 
recapitalisations of concerned banks signalled to investors that the authorities were taking strong policy 
actions to safeguard their financial sectors, even at a fiscal cost. The financial backing of the authorities 
has been key to these AMCs’ effectiveness. 
Ultimately, full financial sector repair can only partly be aided by an AMC. In this regard, the State-aid 
measures, including bank restructurings, that had to accompany NAMA and Sareb, have helped address 
banking competition issues that are also crucial for financial stability. Still, financial sector challenges 
remain. For example, Ireland still has a very high NPL ratio that requires sustained policy actions, while 
in Spain the privatisation and restructuring of state-owned banks has to advance further. In both countries 
banking sector lending to the private sector remains subdued. Hence, AMCs can best achieve their 
broader objectives only if they are complemented with other actions aimed at saving viable banks and 
promptly resolving the non-viable ones. 
The recent developments in the EU regulatory framework changed and expanded the toolbox available 
for addressing acute banking sector problems, introducing a means by which to better address the 
sovereign-banking loop that drove a number of the crisis response measures in the recent past. It also 
reduces the value for AMCs that can be drawn from NAMA’s, Sareb’s and FMS’ regulatory experiences. 
First of all, the Eurostat rules have changed: even if the AMC is mostly privately-owned, it will be 
classified as part of the general government if its funding structure has a government guarantee, as the 
sovereign effectively bears the financial risk. Secondly, the burden sharing requirements for private sector 
creditors have been significantly strengthened with the implementation of BRRD in 2016 in order to 
reinforce shareholder and creditor responsibility and spread the risk burden: the capital needs of a bank 
should be covered by private sources, otherwise the full bail-in requirement is triggered and the affected 
bank is put into resolution. With the BRRD, an AMC involving State aid can only be implemented if the 
affected bank is in resolution. This is also reflected in Atlante’s ownership and operational structure, 
which is influenced by the BRRD rules. Other countries with NPL issues such as Portugal are looking 
into potentially introducing similar models. In any case, any future ʽAMC-likeʼ initiative should be part of 
a broader set of policy measures, including bank restructuring and legal reforms, to increase their 
effectiveness.  
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Details and set up of the AMCs 
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 NAMA Sareb FMS Wertmanagement 
1. Overall stated 
objective 
According to Section 10 of the NAMA Act, NAMA’s 
objectives are: 
a) acquire eligible bank assets from participating 
institutions,  
b) deal with these assets expeditiously, and 
c) protect and enhance the value of those assets, in the 
interests of the state. 
 
In addition, the NAMA Board agreed on five key 
strategic objectives: 
1) the redemption of senior bonds and recovery of 
operating costs over its lifetime, 
2) active support of a sustained property market activity 
in Ireland,  
3) optimisation of the realized value of its assets, 
4) contribution to the socio-economic development in 
Ireland (an objective of the NAMA Act), and  
5) active asset management in order to optimize returns. 
According to Article 3 of Royal Decree 1559/2012 
establishing AMCs, Sareb’s objectives are: 
a) contribute to the cleaning up of the financial sector 
by acquiring assets for an effective transfer of their risk, 
b) minimise public financial support, 
c) service its debt and bonds issued, 
d) minimise possible market distortions that could be 
caused by its actions, and 
e) dispose of received assets optimising their value, in 
the required time frame. 
 
From Article 17 of Royal Decree 1559/2012, Sareb’s 
social objectives are: 
1) to hold, manage, acquire and dispose of assets from 
credit institutions and any future acquired assets while 
avoiding conflict of interests, and 
2) to follow principals on transparency and professional 
management. 
According to Article 2 of the Charter of FMS, its main 
function is to take over the transferred assets of the 
HRE group and realise and unwind them to maximise 
the asset’s value for the purpose of stabilising the HRE 
group and the financial market. 
FMS also aims to achieve these strategic goals:  
a) acceptance of non-strategic and at-risk assets, 
liabilities and derivative from the HRE group,  
b) profit-oriented wind-up of the assets,  
c) cost-effective servicing and management of the 
assets, and 
d) cost-effective funding and separate market access 
for FMS’s treasury/markets division. 
2. Asset type and 
book value 
amount  
EUR 74.2 billion book value of loans were transferred 
(44% of 2009 GDP) with properties as security for land 
& development and associated loans, in addition to a 
small amount of derivatives. Loans were acquired from 
five participating banks: Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish 
Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Irish National 
Building Society (INBS) and Educational Building 
Society (EBS). In the case of AIB and BOI, a minimum 
loan threshold of EUR 20 million was applied in order to 
Sareb received almost 200,000 property and financial 
assets, and 400,000 collateral assets with a book value 
of EUR 107.4 billion (10% of 2012 GDP) and 
transferred in two phases. Only real estate properties 
with a value of over EUR 100,000 and financial assets 
worth over EUR 250,000 were transferred, all within 
Spain.  
The main tranche (EUR 36.6 billion) was transferred on 
The nominal value of the original portfolio transferred 
in October 2010 was EUR 175.6 billion spread over 
7,100 individual exposures. This, together with FMS’s 
additional liquidity needs, amounted to about 8% of 
2010 GDP. The assets were transferred from the HRE 
group, which included HRE Holding and its three 
subsidiaries, pbb Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AGG 




cap the number of borrowers. 
The portfolio transferred in nine tranches consisted of 
about 12,000 loans from 800 debtors, with 
approximately 60,000 properties as security. The transfer 
of the first bundle of tranches (EUR 15.3 billion in 
nominal value) was completed in May 2010, that of the 
second in August 2010 (EUR 11.9 billion), the third 
tranche of EUR 44 billion completed during the last 
quarter of 2010 and the remaining EUR 3 billion in 
March 2011. 71% of the acquired loans’ collateral were 
completed properties, 20% was land and 9% were 
properties in some stage of development. About 56% 
was in Ireland and about a third in the UK. 
As part of the liquidation of IBRC, NAMA was also 
directed by the government to acquire the EUR 12.9 
billion IBRC floating charge in exchange for senior 
bonds from the CBI in early 2013. These bonds were all 
redeemed by 2014. 
31 December 2012, from the five nationalised banks: 
Bankia, Catalunya Banc, Banco de Valencia, and 
Novagailicia Banco, Banco Gallego. The second 
transfer (EUR 14.1 billion) took place on 28 February, 
2013 from the four banks that received state funding: 
Liderbank, Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), Banco Caja3 
and Banco CEISS.  
About 23% of the value of the assets were real estate 
assets in Spain, mostly plots of land and housing 
(vacant and rented) with some industrial warehouses 
and retail units. 77% of the value of the transferred 
portfolio was property development loans, including 
loans for plots of land, projects under construction and 
completed properties. However, over time property 
assets are gaining more weight in the portfolio as 
current loans are repaid and as property collateral is 
accessed in the case of loans in arrears. 
HRE Finance BV in Liquidation.  
FMS purchased risk positions and non-strategic assets, 
liabilities and derivatives from HRE. They are divided 
in four main portfolios: public sector bonds and loans 
(49% of the initial total), structured products such as 
ABS, RMBS, CMBS and CDO (25%), commercial 
real estate (15%) and infrastructure (10%). 
Infrastructure and public sector holdings have longer 
average maturities (2030 and later). 
In 2014 FMS took over DEPFA for wind-down. The 
wind-down of Depfa’s remaining portfolio (about EUR 
40 billion) was not transferred to FMS and is being 
managed by Depfa as a separate institution.  
3. Ownership 
The NAMA SPV (NAMAIL) is 51% owned by private 
investors (Walbrook Capital, New Ireland Assurance Co. 
plc and Percy Nominees Ltd) and by 49% owned by 
NAMA. NAMA also has a veto power over all decisions 
taken by the SPV. 
 
45% of Sareb’s share capital is owned by the Fund for 
Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB), the public entity 
created to manage the banking sector restructuring 
process. 55% of Sareb’s equity is held by the following 
private shareholders: 14 national banks (Santander, 
Caixabank, Banco Sabadell, Banco Popular, 
Kutxabank, Ibercaja, Bankinter, Unicaja, Cajamar, Caja 
Laboral, Banca March, Cecabank, Banco Cooperativo 
Español and Banco Caminos); 2 foreign banks, 
(Deutsche Bank and Barclays Bank), a utility company 
(Iberdrola); and ten insurance companies (Mapfre, 
Mutua Madrileña, Catalana Occidente, Axa, Generali, 
Zurich, Reale, Pelayo, Asisa and Santa Lucía). 
FMS is 100% publicly-owned as the German Financial 
Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin) owns FMS. The 
German Financial Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFiN) 
was established in 2008 by the German parliament as a 
measure of stabilization for the financial system. The 
Financial Market Stabilisation Agency (FMSA) was 
set-up at the same time to manage SoFFiN. SoFFiN 
has been closed for new applications for assistance 
since end-2015, while FMSA’s functions are 
undergoing a reorganization process with the new set-
up set to be in place from 2018.   
4. Funding 
Funding consisted of EUR 30 billion in state-guaranteed 
senior bonds, EUR 1.6 billion in subordinated bonds and 
EUR 100 million in equity. NAMA senior bonds are 
Original funding was EUR 50.8 billion in state-
guaranteed senior debt with maturity of one to three 
years and EUR 3.6 billion in subordinated debt (15-year 
Funding originally was EUR 124 billion of SoFFiN 
(government) bonds that were transferred to FMS 




guaranteed by the Minister for Finance and pay a flat 
coupon of 6-month Euribor. The redemption value of 
NAMA subordinated debt payments depends on its 
performance. While the payment of the coupon is 
discretionary, the interest rate is the 10-year Irish 
Government Bond rate on the day of first issue plus a 
margin of 0.75%. The interest was paid in 2014, 2015 
and 2016.  
The government would benefit from any profits made by 
NAMA while potential end-losses, after burden sharing by 
subordinated debt holders, would be borne by banks by the 
imposition of a levy. NAMA first became profitable (after 
impairment charges and taxes) in 2011. As of June 2016, it 
expects to make a cumulative profit of up to EUR 2.3 
billion by the time it winds down in 2020. 
callable bonds convertible into equity). In 2015, Sareb’s 
initial shareholders’ equity of EUR 1.2 billion was 
wiped out due the need to provision an additional EUR 
2 billion following the new Bank of Spain accounting 
valuation framework, but the capital was restored by the 
conversion into equity of EUR 2.2 billion in 
subordinated debt. Following this, Sareb had EUR 953 
million in equity and EUR 1.4 billion in subordinated 
debt. Since its creation in 2012, Sareb has recorded pre-
tax losses. 
 
SoFFin bonds were replaced by own funding by 2011. 
The annual funding plan is based on EUR 2 billion in 
expected annual sale proceeds in addition to a mix of 
money market (short-term funding or commercial 
paper and repos) and capital market issuances (long-
term funding or bonds). In 2014, capital market 
funding accounted for almost half of total funding 
(compared to about 14% in 2010/2011). As an issuer, 
FMS benefits from an explicit sovereign guarantee that 
results in a ranking equal to that of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This ensures favourable funding 
costs 
SoFFiN also has to compensate for all losses that FMS 




NAMA established a special purpose vehicle (SPV), 
NAMAIL, to purchase, manage and sell the assets 
transferred, NAMAIL is a public-private partnership 
between the state and private investors.  
NAMA is divided into six main business divisions: asset 
recovery, asset management, residential delivery, chief 
financial officer, strategy and communications, and 
legal. NAMAIL is not classified as a monetary financial 
institution or bank. 
It had about 370 employees at end-2014 and announced 
to reduce the number to 291 by end-2015 and to 255 by 
end-2016. As part of its wind-down strategy, in 2015 
NAMA introduced a redundancy scheme. However as of 
June 2016, NAMA had a staff of 341, of which 50 on 
leave under the Voluntary Redundancy Scheme, 
reflecting a longer lifetime strategy stemming from its 
expanded residential delivery programme. The majority 
Centralised. 
Sareb is structured into four main units: the president’s 
unit which handles internal audit, communications, 
investor relations and corporate social responsibilities; a 
legal, corporate development unit; a business unit; and a 
global resources unit. It uses external servicers for the 
management of assets and administrative services. 
Sareb does not have a banking license.  
At end-2014 SAREB had 314 employees, up 62% from 
2013. In 2014, the average experience per employee 
was 16.8 years in various sectors, including notably, the 
financial and property sectors. Most staff are recruited 
from the private sector. 
Single-purpose. 
FMS organizes its work around five main areas: risk 
and finance; treasury/markets; commercial real estate; 
corporate and asset finance; and operations, legal and 
support. It uses FMS Service Company for portfolio 
management and administrative servicers, while 
DEPFA Bank plc is in charge of unwinding its own 
assets. FMS is not a credit/financial services 
institution, a securities firm nor an insurance company. 
FMS has recruited largely from the private sector, 
including the HRE group. At end-2014, FMS had 141 





of staff were recruited from the private sector. 
6. Strategy 
The initial debt reduction target was 25% by end-2013, 
80% by end-2017, 100% by end-2019. The wind-down 
was to be completed by 2020 at latest. On the back of 
the recovery in commercial real estate prices, this was 
revised in 2014 to a target of 80% of senior bonds (EUR 
24 billion) redeemed by end-2016 and all senior bonds 
by end-2018. 
NAMA never set exact target rates of return on its 
investments (beyond the ‘best achievable’ formulation) 
as the NAMA Board was of the view that this would 
constrain its flexibility.  
NAMA has also committed to funding the delivery of a 
cumulative 4,500 residential housing units by end-2016 
through its debtors and through commercial joint 
funding arrangements with developers, in order to ease 
the supply shortage in Dublin. In October 2015 this 
number was revised upwards to a cumulative 5,000 new 
homes by end 2016 and the delivery of 2,000 social 
housing units by end 2015. Under it residential funding 
programme, NAMA aims to fund the delivery of 20,000 
housing units between 2016 and 2020. 
The divestment plan is over 15 years, the maximum 
lifespan that the company will have. The original 
business plan envisaged that 75% of revenues will be 
generated from the sale of houses and the rest from the 
sale of loans. It expected that half of its housing 
portfolio will be sold in the first five years and that 
some of its residential properties will be let out. It was 
originally estimated that shareholders will achieve a 
rate of return of 13-14%.  
Under the Affordable Housing Transfer Plan, Sareb has 
signed agreements with various regional governments 
to temporarily transfer homes to local authorities for a 
low fee, whom then rent out the homes. Sareb has 
agreed to provide 4000 homes for this. Sareb is also 
working on a retail unit plan for entrepreneurs that 
require an affordable place for their business. 
The initial strategy for FMS envisioned a fixed life-
span of ten years, after which any residual portfolio 
was to be sold at book value. FMS revised it to better 
reflect the long-term average maturities of the assets 
contained in its portfolio. The business plan and 
strategy is made for the next ten-years, each year, on a 
rolling basis. According to FMS, this provides more 
flexibility for the management to ‘unwind the portfolio 
whenever it is financially advantageous and thus to 
achieve the best possible outcome in the interest of the 
German taxpayer’.  
7. Pricing of 
assets transferred 
Assets were priced at EUR 31.8 billion, representing a 
57% haircut. The average haircut on banks’ portfolios 
ranged from 43% (BOI) to 61% (Anglo/INBS). The 
granular valuation of assets was done separately on the 
basis of the market value on November 30, 2009, by 
NAMA and by a panel of private professional property 
evaluators. In case of disagreement among their 
assessments, a third independent evaluator was 
introduced. An upwards adjustment of 0-25% was then 
applied to reflect the real economic value of the loan to 
which the haircut could be applied.  
The valuations had to be made in several tranches. The 
Total assets were valued at EUR 50.8 billion, a 52.7% 
haircut. There was a 46% average haircut for loans and 
63% average haircut for foreclosed assets. 
The transfer price was calculated on the basis on the 
real economic value of the assets which incorporated 
the expected lossess from the baseline scenario of the 
stress test calculated by the consulting firm Oliver 
Wyman in September 2012. Extra haircuts were then 
applied, 14% for loans and 7% for foreclosed assets, for 
other factors such as maintenance costs, financing costs, 
legal and recovery costs.  
The portfolio of EUR 175.7 billion was transferred on 
a book value basis with minimal haircuts.  
A valuation of the bond portion of the portfolio 
transferred (about EUR 110 billion) was made shortly 
after the transfer by FMS’s own portfolio managers 
who estimated the market value of that portion at about 
EUR 86 billion  
In addition to the assets transferred, FMS needed about 
EUR 25 billion to fund the assets acquired and build-
up liquidity buffers. This brought the total fiscal cost to 




CBI decided that the first tranche was to be 
representative for the whole developer loan portfolio so 
the initial haircut was applied across the board in 
expectance of a full valuation. However, it turned out 
that higher haircuts had to be applied to subsequent 
tranches as accurate information emerged later.  
In October 2015, the Bank of Spain released new 
accounting requirements that establish one-by-one 
appraisal of all assets at market prices by end-2016. 
This means Sareb must appraise 100,000 properties, 
400,000 property collaterals and about 70,000 loans. 
These valuations resulted in new provision 
requirements of EUR 2 billion applied retroactively to 




By end-2015, close to EUR 33 billion had been 
generated by the sale of loans/property and debtors 
refinancing their debt. EUR 22.1 billion (73%) of the 
EUR 30.2 billion senior bonds were redeemed. Since the 
establishment of NAMA, its portfolio has reduced by 
EUR 23.8 billion or 75.3%. 
NAMA does not own the properties and is not formally a 
developer. NAMA uses an active portfolio management 
strategy: the ‘factory’ model instead of the ‘warehouse’ 
model. The management strategy envisions about half of 
the investment being recovered by partial or full 
restructurings, including by supporting debtors, and the 
other half by disposals (consensual and enforced). 
NAMA directly manages 194 largest debtors that 
account for EUR 60 billion par debt of loans acquired. 
The debtors propose a business plan for meeting their 
repayment obligation to NAMA, NAMA can accept it, 
with or without additional changes, or proceed to 
enforcement/sale of loans or property collateral. NAMA 
can advance new funds to debtors from its profits in the 
interest of a larger or full recovery of the debt owned 
(i.e. for completion of projects). Debtors, not NAMA, 
are in charge of managing the underlying property. 
Properties are usually sold on the open market by private 
treaty, public auction, public tender and sealed bid. 
Debtors are not allowed to buy their debt.  
By end-2015, Sareb’s assets had declined by 15.4% to 
EUR 43 billion; it has generated EUR 12.8 billion and 
had repaid 14.4% of its original senior debt of EUR 
50.7 billion. 
Sareb has acquired the assets it controls. Sales of its 
assets are undertaken by itself directly but mostly 
indirectly through its servicers. Sareb decides what 
assets to sell. In 2014 SAREB worked on the transition 
from a ‘warehouse’ to a ‘factory’ business model. Thus, 
Sareb transitioned from being an asset liquidator, 
focused on selling at the best prices and with more 
dependence on the economic cycle, to an asset manager 
focusing more on creating value added, so that the 
return from the transaction increases when sold. 
The business plan which defines the divestment process 
is revised and updated by law annually by Sareb and 
approved by the board.  
The divestment strategy targets the retail channel, and 
the wholesale channel targeting institutional investors. 
The latter is used to sell packages and portfolios of 
assets and uses a range of vehicles such as Banks Asset 
Funds (Fondos de Activos Bancarios or FAB), Asset 
Leasing Companies (Sociedades de Arrendamientos de 
Activos) and SOCIMIS. A FAB is a special low-tax 
fund in which Sareb maintains a share of the capital. 
SOCIMIS are normally listed commercial companies 
At end-2015, the size of FMS’s portfolio was EUR 
94.7 billion, a decrease of over 46% from the initial 
portfolio size. Currency effects have had a negative 
impact of over EUR 4 billion over this period. 
FMS undertakes banking and financial services 
transactions necessary to unwind the portfolio. 
However, it does not engage in new lending.  
The portfolio is divided into parts that are more and 
less actively managed. The three main approaches are 
hold (when risks/earning are acceptable), sell (risky 
assets, as opportunities arise) and restructure 
(commercial real estate and infrastructure assets). 
The sales process is complicated due to the variety of 
markets that need to be addressed. Portfolio managers 
monitor specific markets and sales proposals. The 
proposals are then scrutinised by the servicers in order 
to establish whether the estimated sales price would be 
value-maximising in the context of the overall 
portfolio wind-down. If this is the case, the sales 
process is then organized, sometimes with the 
involvement of the FMSA. Generally the minimum 
binding sales price is established and a successful 
bidding involves at least three bidders.  
FMS’s public sector holdings are often connected to 




The residual portfolio (about EUR 13 billion in total, 
divided over 482 smaller debtors) was managed by AIB, 
BOI and Capita. 
By the end of 2013, almost 75% of disposed assets were 
UK-related, due to a later recovery in the Irish market. 
At the same time, Irish disposals accounted for only 
16%. As the Irish market recovered, in the period from 
2014 to end-2015 about 56% of assets sold were Irish. 
The domestic portfolio sales amount to EUR 11.9 billion 
cumulative since the beginning. In 2014, NAMA 
announced its intention to bring at least EUR 250 
million in property portfolios to the market each quarter. 
EUR 2 billion in vendor financing was made available in 
2012 for up to 75% of the purchase price of prime 
investment commercial properties, to help seed demand 
in the Irish market. The take up has, however, been 
limited (about EUR 400 million in April 2015), mostly 
due to sufficient liquidity in the debt markets and the 
prevalence of international investors.  
that invest in real-estate properties, mostly rental 
business, similar to Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs). Property-related loans can be disposed of as 
large sindicated loans, individual loans, sale of the loan 
collateral to repay the loan, and loan portfolios. 
Sareb utilises an open competitive tendering process to 
sell to institutional investors. It also uses a minimum 
sale price. 
Sareb has also launched an online sales channel 
(www.inmuebles-sareb.es) for properties.  
A portion of the structured products holdings is highly 
illiquid and requires a longer period of hold in addition 
to restructuring when possible.  
The strategy for the infrastructure portfolio is an 
individual restructuring approach with the aim of 
either the debtor (partially) repaying its debt or the sale 
of the loan. 
FMS’s commercial real estate portfolio shrunk by 
almost 70% since 2010. Many sales resulted in profits 
above the book value on the back of the market 
recovery, especially in the U.S.  
9. Governance 
and transparency 
The establishment and governance of NAMA was laid 
out in the National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 
(NAMA Act). The board must carry out its functions 
independently but is closely guided by its obligations 
under the Act. The minister for finance can issue binding 
written guidelines and directions to NAMA.  
NAMA operates under several codes of conduct/practice 
for the board, officers, risk management, servicing 
standards, asset disposals and commercial interests of 
non-participating institutions. 
The NAMA board is made up of seven members non-
executive and two ex- officio. All members are 
appointed by the Minister for Finance. The chief 
executive of NAMA and the chief executive of the 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) are 
SAREB’s governance bodies are the general meeting, 
composed of the shareholders, and the board of directors. 
The latter in 2014 comprised fifteen members, five of 
which were independent. The rest of the board is 
composed of eight proprietary directors, who represent 
the main shareholders of the company, and two 
executives, the chairperson and chief executive officer. 
SAREB is supervised by the Bank of Spain, and is 
responsible for overseeing compliance with SAREB’s 
objectives and requirements established for AMCs, and 
regulations relating to transparency and the company’s 
governance. SAREB is also supervised by the Spanish 
National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) in 
relation to its business activity as an issuer of fixed-
income securities.  
FMS has a supervisory board consisting of eight 
members appointed by the stakeholder that aid with the 
unwinding of assets. There is also an executive board, 
with at least two members appointed by the 
supervisory board with and FMSA’s approval. It 
manages FMS’s business and represents it in and out 
of court. 
The Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation 
(FMSA) supervises FMS, including extensive 
information, controlling, audit and instruction rights. 
This includes the involvement in strategic decisions 
and business plan revisions. The Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - BaFin) is the financial 




ex-officio members of the Board. 
In addition to quarterly reports, NAMA is obliged to 
issue annual statements and accounts to the Minister for 
Finance and the two houses of parliament. The annual 
accounts are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General. All the reports are provided to the parliament 
and published on NAMA’s website 
(https://www.nama.ie). 
There is also an external monitoring committee which 
analyses the business plan, the divestment plans and 
plans for the repayment of the secured debt. It is made 
up of four members and a representative from the 
European Central Bank also attends meetings as an 
observer. 
SAREB prepares half-yearly reports on its activities, 
which are subject to an annual compliance report by an 
independent expert. The reports are public via 
SAREB’s website (www.Sareb.es).  
German Banking Act, German Securities Trading Act 
and German Money Laundering Act that are all 
binding for FMS. Lastly, a parliamentary committee 
supervises all beneficiaries of SoFFin measures, 
including FMS. 
The executive board is required to prepare periodic 
reports to FMSA including its annual financial 
statements, quarterly reports, management and audit 
reports. The annual financial statements are audited. 
The financial reports are posted on its website 
(http://www.fms-wm.de). 
10. Servicing and 
other operational 
and legal issues  
The primary servicing (loan administration, charging of 
interest/fees) loans is outsourced to Capita Asset 
Services and AIB for a fee (and very little to BOI). All 
special servicing (case management, interaction with 
debtors) is now carried out NAMA directly. Until 
NAMA disposed of the loans of smaller debtors in 2015, 
special servicing of the loans of smaller debtors had 
been carried out by Capita, AIB and BOI. Capita has the 
status of master servicer in charge of collating loan data 
and providing the consolidated financial and 
management information on NAMA’s portfolio. 
The NTMA provides NAMA with business and support 
services, such as human resources, IT and market risk 
analysis, and gets reimbursed by NAMA for the costs of 
these services.  
NAMA had to get the legal documentation of assets in 
order. Some of the problems reported were defective land 
registries, missing original documents, unaudited and self-
certified documents, unconfirmed guarantees and items of 
security not actually taken. There were also cases of the 
originating banks accepting debtors’ own valuations of 
their assets and liabilities as basis for new lending.  
Sareb outsources the servicing and management of 
assets. Initially when Sareb was set up, it used the 
contributing banks for the management and 
administration of assets (or as servicers). As the 
previous servicing contracts expired at the end of 2014, 
SAREB decided to change the servicing model in order 
to improve its activity. In late 2014, the AMC hired four 
new servicing companies, including distressed debt 
funds, to assist it in managing cash flow, debt servicing, 
restructuring loans and selling assets. The servicers will 
also deal with technology, information systems and 
documentation. These are Haya Real Estate, Altamira, 
Servihabitat and Solvia. The migration to the new 
servicers was finalised by end-April 2016.  
Sareb has also faced problems with the lack of accurate 
information and documentation of the assets. For 
example, there were problems with details in the 
collateral monitoring systems in the original 
transferring banks. Discrepancies are commonly 
revealed during the due diligence when an investor 
wants to buy an asset or portfolio.  
The wind-up of the assets is carried out in part by FMS 
itself and partly by external service providers. Until 
September 2013, the latter was done by its subsidiary 
PBB that further outsourced some servicing activities 
to other companies of the HRE group. Now this 
servicing is done by FMS’s own servicing entity, FMS 
Service Company, with offices in Germany, UK, 
Ireland and the US. Due to the complexity of the 
portfolio, outsourcing the servicing would involve 
multiple contracts which could have an adverse effect 
on the overall management of the portfolio. Thus, FMS 
created its own service provider and recruited a lot of 
HRE group staff, in this way retaining expertise and 
business continuity. 
Key areas of information technology are outsourced to 
IBM Deutschland GmbH. 
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